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Interlinkage in the Rice Market of Ghana: Money-lending Millers Enhance Efficiency 
Abstract 
Most of the large-scale millers in Ghana provide a loan to the farmers under the agreement 
that the farmers will bring their paddy to them. This paper examines the effect of this 
interlinkage on the efficiency of rice milling. A quadratic cost function was estimated, and 
capacity utilization was calculated in relation to money lending. The results show that if the 
millers provide a loan to the farmers, the operating rate will increase by 24%. 
Key words: Interlinkage; Rice miller; Capacity utilization; Money lending; Ghana 
1.  Introduction 
The development of local agricultural market is a crucial part of agricultural development in 
developing countries. Its importance has been enhanced because of recent trade liberalization. 
One of the significant phenomena in rural economies is interlinked transaction. Although such 
informal market institutions reflect uneven distribution of social power (Crow and Murshid, 
1994), they could be efficient given market conditions. Hence, by studying the nature of 
interlinkages in a particular region, we will be able to identify the constraints to market 
development and to obtain meaningful policy implications. On this line, the present paper 
analyzes the rice markets in Ghana, particularly focusing on rice millers. 
In Ghana, average yearly rice consumption per capita increased from 7.3 kg in the 1980’s 
to 13.2 kg in the 1990’s. During the same period, rice imports also increased from 53.4  
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thousand metric tons (MT) to 123.4 thousand MT. This sharp increase in rice imports caused 
an expansion of the trade deficit, which has become a serious macro economic problem 
(ISSER, 2002). Therefore, enhancing domestic rice supply is an urgent policy issue now. This 
requires not only an increase of local rice production but also the development of its markets. 
For the local rice to be competitive in the market, the improvement of post harvest processing, 
particularly of rice milling, is essential. This urges us to examine the efficiency of rice milling 
in Ghana. 
Millers are one of the key players in the Ghana’s rice market. After hand threshing, rice 
producers by themselves bring the paddy to millers. The millers mill the paddy and charge 
milling fee to the producers. After milling, the producers sell milled rice to traders who come 
to the millers to purchase it. Unlike other places where rice millers are also rice traders, the 
role of millers in Ghana is only intermediary: they announce the prices of milled rice 
according to the market prices and the transactions between producers and traders take place 
based on the prices. It is also frequent that producers leave the milled rice at the mill and the 
millers sell it to traders in place of the producers, although millers do not directly purchase 
and sell rice. 
Not only the act of intermediary, we found that some millers provide rice producers with 
funds on a loan basis under the agreement that they will bring paddy to the millers, and 
surprisingly in most cases without interest. Now, an interesting question is if this interlinkage  
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between producers and millers is Pareto improving. However, this paper deals with only 
millers. That is, we examine if the millers’ no interest loan enhances the efficiency of their 
milling operation. To this end, we estimate a short-run cost function for the millers and 
evaluate the impact of money-lending on the operating rate as well as profitability. 
2.  Characteristics of rice millers 
Sixty one millers were selected randomly from the Kumasi area in Ghana. We interviewed the 
owners and the operators to obtain the information on mill and milling activities in 2001. 
Most of the rice millers were established in recent years: 44% of them were established 
during the last five years. This sharp increase in the number of millers reflects the recent 
policy of the government of Ghana that encourages rice production, and also implies that the 
milling is profitable. 
There is large variation in milling capacity (from 75 to 5220 kg/day: the mean = 1637 
kg/day and the standard deviation = 1321kg/day). Relatively large-scale millers use one-path 
type milling machine made in Japan or China, and the other millers use the Engelberg type 
milling machine made in India or Ghana. The correlation coefficient of the milling capacity 
and the variable profit per produced milled rice is found to be 0.445, suggesting that larger 
scale millers tend to get a higher profit per milled rice production
1.  
With respect to interlinkage, twenty seven millers provided a loan to farmers in 2001 
under the agreement that they would bring paddy to the millers. Six of these millers imposed  
 
4
an interest rate and the average rate was 82%, which is close to the market interest rate. The 
other twenty one millers did not impose any interest to farmers.   
We tried to identify invisible cost imposed to the farmers other than interest, for example 
fixed price agreement (Crow and Murshid, 1994), but we could not find anything except for 
the paddy-bringing agreement. This agreement incurs additional cost to farmers if there are 
more favorable markets for them (e.g. less transportation cost, higher rice price, etc.). 
However, it is difficult for millers to enforce this agreement, and hence, we consider that 
millers’ bargaining position is weak in this interlinkage transaction. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that millers can increase the operating rate of their milling machines at the cost of 
providing no interest loan to farmers. 
Table 1 shows the average economic variables for the millers who lent or did not lend 
money. These results suggest that millers who provide a loan to the farmers show a higher 
production, lower unit variable cost, and higher unit variable profit. 
3.  Model 
The cost minimization problem of a miller expressed as follows: 
min.  C
T = wLL + wVV + wKK         (1) 
s.t.  Y = f (L, V, K) ,          ( 2 )  
where Y is the milled rice production, L is the labor input, V is the input for machine running 
such as fuel, K is the capital input, wL, wV, and wK are input prices for L, V, and K.  
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If the capital input K is a fixed factor, variable cost function is defined as follows: 
C
V = C
V (Y, wL, wV, K)         (3) 
and short-run cost function is defined as follows: 
C
S = C
V (Y, wL, wV, K) + wKK.         ( 4 )  
3.1 Capacity utilization 
This paper uses “capacity utilization” derived by Morrison (1999) as the index for the 
operating rate. There are two other indices. One is the rate of actual operating hours observed 
and maximum possible operating hours. This index is very popular; however, the definition of 
“maximum possible” is ambiguous. The other index is the rate of actual operating hours 
observed and maximum operating hours in the past. Although this index is easy to calculate, it 
can be frequently changed by the addition of data. Therefore, we do not use these indices in 
our study. 
Capacity utilization is based on the production in the steady state of the fixed factor. If a 
variable cost function is estimated, the parameter of the change of the variable cost to the 
change of the fixed factor can be obtained. By using the parameter, shadow cost C
SD is given 









K .           (5) 
On the other hand, total cost C
T is calculated by the following equation: 
C
T = C
V + wKK .           (6)  
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CU = .           ( 7 )  
This will be used in the miller model as an index of the operating rate of the milling machine. 
3.2 Treatment of self-selection bias 
In this paper, it will be determined whether a miller operates his or her milling machine close 
to the optimum level by providing a loan to the farmers. However, because the decision of 
loan provision is endogenous, an efficient miller may also provide a loan to the farmers. 
Hence, we need to control for this “self-selection bias.” We apply two-stage regression 
method presented by Carter (1989). 
First, the determinate variable D of loan providing is regressed on the vector of exogenous 
variables X as follows: 
D = A’X - u.          ( 8 )  
The following switching regression function is introduced by combining conditional 
expected values of variable costs: 
) 0 ( prob ] 0 | [ ) 1 ( prob ] 0 | [ ] [ = ≤ + = > = P D C E P D C E C E N
V
L
V V  
) X ' A ( ) ( ) X ' A ( Z ) ' B ' B ( Z ' B φ σ σ N L N L N − + Φ − + = ,       ( 9 )  
where  Φ  is the cumulative distribution function,  φ   is the probability density function, P is 
binary variables which equals one if a miller provides loan and equal zero otherwise, 
) X ' A ( ) 1 ( prob Φ = = P ,  ) X ' A ( 1 ) 0 ( prob Φ − = = P , and Z is the vector of variables in the  
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short-run cost function given by function (4), i.e., Y, wL, wV, and K. To estimate function (9), 
first, parameter A is obtained by estimating equation (8) in Probit model, and  ) X ' A ( Φ  and 
) X ' A ( φ   of each miller are calculated by using the parameter. Next, parameters B’N, B’L-B’N, 
and  N L σ σ −  are estimated by using the variables Z,  ) X ' A ( Φ , and  ) X ' A ( φ .  Z ) ' B ' B ( N L−  
is the average effect that shows the changes in the variable cost when the average miller 
provides a loan to the farmers, where Z  is the sample mean of Z.  N L σ σ −  is the 
differential effect that indicates differences in the variable cost by factors except for 
observable variables. 
3.3 Empirical model 
If the short-run cost function (4) is specified in a normalized quadratic function, the switching 
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Applying Shephard’s lemma to function (10), the following conditional input demand  
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From the linear homogeneous condition of prices and variable cost, the following conditional 
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Parameters of the variable cost function (10) are obtained by system estimation for functions 
(10), (11), and (12). 
By differentiating the variable cost function in the function (10) with respect to capital 
input K and multiplying by the wage rate wL, the shadow value of capital is given as follows: 
V VKN L YKN L KKN L KN L
L
V V
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By substituting parameters and average values of variables into equation (13), the shadow  
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value of capital is calculated, and the shadow cost is obtained by substituting it into equation 
(5). After calculating the total cost, the capacity utilization is obtained by equation (7). Two 
cases in which millers did not lend money, i.e., the term for  ) X ' A ( Φ  is zero and otherwise 
will be compared. 
4.  Data 
4.1 Price and quantity of capital 
In order to estimate the cost function and to obtain capacity utilization, we need to have 
reasonable estimates for the price of capital, wK, as well as quantity of capital utilized, K. For 
the price of capital, we use capital price index. This is the weighted average of the user cost 
price of the milling machine and construction. On the other hand, capital quantity index is 
used as the quantity of capital. This is calculated as the total depreciation cost over the capital 
price index. 
The user cost price of the milling machine and construction, pku, is calculated by using the 
straight-line method as follows: 
pku = pkp(r + Dr) ,           ( 1 4 )  
where  pkp is the acquisition value, r is the interest rate corresponding to the agricultural 
market rate of Ghana in 2001, i.e., 0.44, and Dr is the depreciation rate. The straight-line 
depreciation rate is the reciprocal number of the durable period. Durable period of the milling 
machine is estimated by millers themselves, and that of the construction is 25 years uniformly.  
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The depreciation cost of the milling machine and construction is also calculated using the 
straight-line method. For the calculation, it is assumed that the salvage value, pks, of the 
milling machine and construction accounts for 10% of the acquisition value. Then, the 
depreciation cost, DC, is calculated by using the following equation: 
DC = (pkp - pks) Dr.          ( 1 5 )  
4.2 Price and quantity of variable inputs 
Labor input is the number of workers for rice milling and its price is the wage rate of the 
operator. Price index of machine running input (i.e., non-labor variable input) is calculated by 
the weighted average of prices of fuel, electricity, oil, and parts of the milling machine. Cost 
shares of these inputs are used as the weights. Quantity index of machine running input is the 
total cost over the price index. 
5.  Estimated parameters 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation (8) by the Probit model. The results 
show the following characteristics are significant for the millers who tend to provide rice 
producers with funds on a loan basis: 1) The millers have large mills, 2) Mills are located in 
Kumasi city, 3) The millers have been engaged in milling over a long period of time, 4) The 
owners and operators are relatively young. 
These results can be interpreted as follows. First, millers who have large milling machine 
tend to provide a loan to farmers, probably because such millers can afford it, but also  
 
11
because such millers need to increase operation rate by providing a loan. Second, the location 
in Kumasi and experience in milling are advantageous for millers to gather information about 
the producers and markets. These points facilitate millers to make loan agreement that is not 
so enforceable. On the other hand, millers in Kumasi have disadvantage in transportation cost 
compared with millers in satellite towns, and consequently they need to attract producers by 
providing a loan. Third, younger entrepreneurs may be more positive to expand their business 
by engaging in non-traditional transactions.   
Next, the system of short-run cost function (10), conditional input demand function of 
machine running (11) and labor (12) is estimated simultaneously by using the predicted values 
for probability density and cumulative distribution obtained from the first-stage Probit 
regression
2. 
By substituting these parameters and average variables into equation (13), the shadow 
value of capital is obtained. Using the shadow value, the shadow cost is calculated and its rate 
for the total cost corresponds to the capacity utilization. Table 3 shows the costs and capacity 
utilization with and without providing a loan respectively. These results suggest that if an 
average miller provides a loan to farmers, the capacity utilization will increase by 24%. 
6.  Concluding remarks 
We examined the effect of providing a loan by millers on milling efficiency by estimating the 
short-run cost function. These results suggest that the operation rate of the mills should  
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increase by 24% by providing a loan to farmers. Furthermore, in this case, the total cost 
should decrease by 17.1% corresponding with the case when no loan is provided and 
consequently the efficiency will increase. Thus, with respect to the interlinkage transaction, 
we can conclude as follows. (1) The amount of paddy collection increases by providing a loan 
to the farmers. (2) The operation rate and the efficiency of the millers are increased. (3) The 
farmers can get their credit with low or no interest. 
However, the emergence of this interlinkage implies inefficiency of the Ghananian rice 
market. First, although our data suggests that relatively larger mills are more technically 
efficient, the millers cannot fully utilize the capacity up to the optimal level. This may be 
caused by the underdevelopment of transportation and storage of paddy as well as the 
difficulty to obtain market information. Second, although we did not investigate the benefit 
that the farmers gain from this interlinkage, we believe that they enjoy the no interest loan as 
far as their crop does not fail. However, naturally this implies that demand for credit among 
cultivators is high and the credit market is not functioning well. 
Large-scale mills should be promoted in Ghana, not only because of the superior 
efficiency but also because of their better milling quality, both of which will enhance 
competitiveness of locally produced rice. However, efficiency of the rice markets may not be 
so improved as expected, without complementary policies to develop efficient transportation, 
storage facilities for alleviating seasonal fluctuations of the operating rate, and information  
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system related to the demand of paddy for milling. 
1 Timmer (1998) considers capital cost and concludes that small-scale millers are more 
efficient in Java. 
2 Estimation results are not provided in this short paper, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table 1 Money lending and economic variables 












Lending (27)  116.6  123.3  90.5 
No lending (34)  32.3  229.7  6.0 
The means are different at the level of 1% significance(***), 5% significance(**), and 10% significance(*), 
respectively. 
 
Table 2 Estimation of the results of the Probit model 
Parameter  Esitmates  t-value    
Intercept  0.9169   0.8860    
Location (1:Kumasi city, 2:other region)  0.9452    2.2399**   
Job related rice before (1:miller of an other region, 2:otherwise)  0.9340    1.2525       
Age of owner of mill  -0.0353    -2.1123**   
Age  of  operator  -0.0224   -1.1315    
Years  of  milling  0.0413   1.7380*   
Capacity of mill  0.0049    2.4613**   
Floor area of milling house  -0.0379    -0.9001       
Fraction of correct prediction: 0.7541. **:5%significant, *:10%significant. 
 
Table 3 Costs and capacity utilization 
Estimates and Average   
No lending  Lending 
Unit  variable  cost  (cedi/kg)  66.811     51.971    
Unit  total  cost  (cedi/kg)  86.600     71.971    
Capacity  utilization  0.683     0.925    
 